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In this paper, we describe an efficient algorithm that decides if a stable matching exists
for a generalized stable roommates problem, where, instead of linear preferences, agents
have partial preference orders on potential partners. Furthermore, we may forbid certain
partnerships, that is, we are looking for a matching such that none of the matched pairs is
forbidden, and yet, no blocking pair (forbidden or not) exists.
To solve the above problem, we generalize the first algorithm for the ordinary stable
roommates problem.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The study of stable matching problems was initiated by Gale and Shapley who introduced the stable marriage problem
in [4]. In this problem, each of n men and n women have a linear preference order on the members of the opposite
gender. We ask if there exists a marriage scheme in which no man and woman mutually prefer one another to their
eventual partners. The authors prove that the so called deferred acceptance algorithm always finds a stable marriage
scheme.
It is natural to ask the same question in a more general, non-bipartite model, in which we have n agents with preference
orders on all other agents. This is the so called stable roommates problem, and we are looking for a matching (i.e. a pairing
of the agents) such that no two agents prefer one another to their assigned partners. Such a matching is called a stable
one. A significant difference between the stable marriage and the stable roommates models is that for the latter, it might
happen that no stable matching exists [4]. A solution for the stable roommates problem was proposed by Irving [5] as an
efficient algorithm that either finds a stablematching or concludes that no stablematching exists for the particular problem.
Later, Tan [9] used this algorithm to give a good characterization, that is, he proved that for any stable roommates problem,
there always exists a so called stable partition (that can be regarded as a half integral fractional stable matching [1]) with
the property that either it is a stable matching, or it is a compact proof for the non-existence of a stable matching in the
particular model.
In both the stable marriage and the stable roommates problems, strict preferences of the participating agents play a
crucial role. However, in many practical situations, we have to deal with indifferences in the preference orders. We model
this phenomenon such that preference orders are partial (rather than linear) orders. We can extend the notion of a stable
matching to this model in at least three different ways [6]. One possibility is that a matching is weakly stable if no pair
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of agents a, b exists such that they mutually prefer one another to their assigned partner. Ronn proved that deciding the
existence of a weakly stable matching is NP-complete for the stable roommates problem [7]. A more restrictive notion is
that a matching is strongly stable if there are no agents a and b such that a prefers b to his assigned partner and b does
not prefer his assigned partner to a. Scott gave an algorithm that finds a strongly stable matching or reports if none exists
in O(m2) time [8]. (Here m stands for the number of edges in the underlying graph.) The most restrictive notion is that of
super-stability. A matching is super-stable if there exist no two agents a and b such that neither of them prefers his assigned
situation in the matching to being a partner of the other. In other words, a matching is super-stable, if it is stable for any
linear extensions of the preference orders of the agents. For the casewhere indifference is transitive (that is, if preferences are
determined by scores that can be equal), Irving andManlove gave an O(m) algorithm to find a super-stablematching, if such
a matching exists [6]. Interestingly, the algorithm has two phases, just like Irving’s [5], but its second phase is completely
different. It is also noted in [6] that the algorithm works without modification for the more general case where preferences
are partial (rather than linear) orders.
The motivation of our present work is to give a direct algorithm for an extension of the super-stable matching problem.
Our algorithm works similarly to Irving’s original algorithm in [5]. This latter algorithm keeps on deleting edges of the
underlying graph until it concludes that no stablematching exists or a single stablematching is left. It turns out that deleting
an edge is too harsh a transformation: our algorithm uses a finer one as well. For this reason, we extend our model such
that we allow so-called forbidden edges and beyond deleting, our algorithm may forbid certain edges. This way we solve a
problem that is a common generalization of the stable marriage problem with forbidden pairs (solved by Dias et al.with an
O(m) algorithm in [2]) and the stable roommates problemwith ties in [6]. Note that in our model we also allow that certain
edges are ‘‘missing’’ from the underlying graph, that is, some agents might be unacceptable to one another. In particular, a
stable matching might contain several agents that have no partners in the matching.
Our present problem, the super-stablematching problemwith forbidden edges is known to be polynomial-time solvable.
Fleiner et al. exhibited a reduction of this problem to 2-SAT [3]. Though the algorithm based on [3] (that applies known
algorithms for the reduced problem) works faster than our presented algorithm, an advantage of our direct approach is
that there is more hope to find structural results on (super-)stable matchings. Also, by generalizing Irving’s algorithm, we
can understand what are those crucial properties that allow the algorithm to work. For this reason, our goal here is not a
‘‘streamlined’’ and fast algorithm based on elaborate data structures but a polynomial-time procedure with a compact proof
of correctness.
To formalize our problem, we define a preference model as a triple (G, F ,O), where G = (V , E) is a finite graph, the set
F of forbidden edges is a subset of the edge set E of G, and O = {≤v: v ∈ V }, where ≤v is a partial order on the star E(v) of
v (that is, the set of those edges of G that are incident with vertex v). It is convenient to think that we deal with a market
situation: vertices ofG are the acting agents and edges ofG represent possible partnerships between them. Parallel edges are
allowed in G: the same two agents may form different partnerships, that may yield different profits for them. (For example
agents u and vmay play tennis or chess and their preferences on these two gamesmight be different.) Partial order<v is the
preference order of agent v on his possible partnerships. Our convention is that partnership e is preferred to partnership f
by agent v if e <v f . In this situation, we say that v prefers e to f or e dominates f at v. A subsetM of E is amatching if edges
of M do not share a vertex, that is, each agent participates in at most one partnership. Matching M is stable (we omit the
‘super’ prefix for convenience), ifM ⊆ E \ F (in other words, no edge ofM is forbidden, that is, all edges ofM are free), and
each edge e of E is dominated by M , that is, there is an edge m ∈ M and a vertex v ∈ V such that m ≤v e. (This means that
either e ∈ M and then because ofm = e,m ≤v e holds for any vertex v of e or e ∉ M and then there must be an edgem ofM
that is better:m <v e. In particular,m and e cannot be incomparable in≤v .) IfM is a matching and e is not dominated byM
then e is a blocking edge of M . The stable roommates problemwith partial orders and forbidden pairs is the search problem on an
input preference model to find a stable matching or to report that no such matching exists. Note that the stable roommates
problem with partial orders and forbidden edges can be reduced to the stable roommates problem with partial orders (and
no forbidden edges) the following way. For each forbidden edge e, introduce a copy e′ parallel to e into the model such that
e and e′ are equivalent (and incomparable) for vertices of e. Furthermore, in this new model, declare all edges to be free. It
is easy to check that the set of stable matchings in the new model is the same as the set of stable matchings (containing no
forbidden edges) in the original model.
Note that in the standard terminology, agents have preferences on possible partners, rather than on partnerships. It is
easy to see that in our approach, this corresponds to the case where the underlying graph G in the preference model is
simple. We also have a slightly different way of defining stability via dominance. Traditionally, we first define the notion of
blocking and thenwe say that a stablematching is amatching that has no blocking edge. Also note that the stable roommates
problem [4,5] is the special case where G is simple, F = ∅, and each order<v is linear.
2. The generalized algorithm
Let us fix a preference model (G0, F0,O0), as the input of our algorithm.We should find a stable matching, if it exists. The
algorithm shall handle so-called 1-arcs and 2-arcs that are oriented versions of certain edges of the underlying model. The
sets of these arcs after the ith step of the algorithm are denoted by A1i and A
2
i , respectively. In the beginning, A
1
0 = A20 = ∅.
The algorithm works step by step. In the (i + 1)st step, it changes the actual instance (Gi, Fi, A1i , A2i ,Oi) into a ‘‘simpler’’
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model (Gi+1, Fi+1, A1i+1, A
2
i+1,Oi+1) in such a way that the answer to the latter problem is also a valid answer to the former
one. That is,
any stable matching in (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1) is a stable matching in (Gi, Fi,Oi) and (1)
and
if there is a stable matching in (Gi, Fi,Oi) then there has to be a stable matching in (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1) as well. (2)
We employ four different kinds of transformations to achieve this goal: we find 1-arcs and 2-arcs, we forbid edges and we
delete forbidden edges.
To describe these transformations, we need a couple of definitions. We say that edge e ∈ Ei(v) of Gi (forbidden or not)
is a first choice edge of v, if there is no edge f ∈ Ei(v) \ Fi with f <v e (i.e., if no free edge dominates e at vertex v).
Note that there can be more than one first choice of v present, moreover, an edge e can be a first choice of both of its
vertices and if v is not an isolated vertex then there is at least one first choice of v. If e = vu is a first choice of v then
wemay change our current instance (Gi, Fi, A1i , A
2
i ,Oi) into (Gi+1, Fi+1, A
1
i+1, A
2
i+1,Oi+1)where Gi+1 = Gi, Ei+1 = Ei, A1i+1 =
A1i ∪{(vu)}, A2i+1 = A2i ,Oi+1 = Oi andwe say that (vu) is a 1-arc. This 1-arc finding transformation clearly satisfies conditions
(1) and (2).
An edge e ∈ Ei(v) is a second choice of v if e is not a first choice of v and e >v f ∉ Fi implies that f is a first choice
of v. In other words, e is a second choice if any free edge that dominates e at v is a first choice of v and there is at least
one such free edge. Note that there can be several second choices of v present in an instance. Moreover, the set of second
choices of v is nonempty if and only if there exist two free edges incident to v such that one dominates the other at v. If
e = vu is a second choice of v then we may change our current instance (Gi, Fi, A1i , A2i ,Oi) into (Gi+1, Fi+1, A1i+1, A2i+1,Oi+1)
where Gi+1 = Gi, Ei+1 = Ei, A1i+1 = A1i , A2i+1 = A2i ∪ {(uv)},Oi+1 = Oi and we say that (uv) is a 2-arc. This 2-arc finding
transformation clearly satisfies conditions (1) and (2). Note that the definition of a 2-arc is somewhat counterintuitive:
unlike in case of a 1-arc, a 2-arc points to that vertex whose second choice it represents. Later we shall see the reason for
this. For each j, we require the following property after the jth step of our algorithm.
Each arc of A1j is a 1-arc of (Gj, Fj,Oj) and (3)
each arc of A2j is a 2-arc of (Gj, Fj,Oj). (4)
Clearly, 1-arc finding and 2-arc finding steps do not violate conditions (3) and (4).
If e is a free edge ofGi, then forbidding emeans thatGi+1 := Gi, Fi+1 := Fi∪{e}, andOi+1 := Oi. After forbidding, A1i+1 = A1i
and A2i+1 = A2i , unless we explicitly state otherwise. The algorithm may forbid e if either no stable matching contains e or
if e is not contained in all stable matchings of (Gi, Fi,Oi). (Note that neither of these conditions implies the other.) Such a
forbidding transformation clearly satisfies (1) and (2). Forbidding a subset C of E means that we simultaneously forbid all
edges of C . We shall do so if properties (1) and (2) hold for j = i+ 1.
If e is a forbidden edge ofGi then deleting emeans thatwe delete e fromGi and Fi to getGi+1: Ei+1 := Ei\{e}, Fi+1 := Fi\{e},
A1i+1 := A1i \ {a ∈ A1i : a = e⃗}, A2i+1 := A2i \ {a ∈ A2i : a = e⃗} (where a = e⃗ means that 1-arc or 2-arc a is coming from
first or second choice e) and the partial orders in Oi+1 are the restrictions of the corresponding partial orders of Oi, to the
corresponding stars of Gi+1. The algorithm may delete forbidden edge e if there exists no matching in (Gi, Fi,Oi) that is
blocked exclusively by e. This implies that the set of stable matchings in (Gi, Fi,Oi) and in (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1) is the same, so
(1) and (2) clearly hold for j = i + 1. As first and second choices do not change after deleting a forbidden edge, properties
(3) and (4) are true for j = i+ 1.
As wementioned already, our algorithmworks in steps and in each step it changes the instance according to some of the
above transformations. There is a certain hierarchy between these steps: the currentmove of the algorithm is always chosen
to have the highest priority among the executable steps. Our description of the step types is in the order of this hierarchy.
0th priority (proposal) step. If edge e = vw is a first choice of v and does not belong to A1i then find 1-arc vw, that is
A1i+1 = A1i ∪ {(vw)}.
We have seen that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied after a proposal step and by definition, (3) and (4) also hold for
j = i+ 1. As soon as the algorithm has found all 1-arcs, it looks for a
1st priority (mild rejection) step. If e⃗ = uv is a 1-arc of A1i , A2i = ∅ and Ei(v) ∋ f ≮v e (that is, f is not strictly better than e
according to v in Gi) then forbid f .
Obviously, if f belongs to some matching M then e ∉ M , and hence e (being a first choice at u) blocks M . So f does not
belong to any stable matching, hence we can safely forbid it. Clearly, any first choice remains a first choice after forbidding
edge e, hence (3) remains true for i + 1. Moreover, after forbidding e a second choice either remains as a second choice or
it becomes a first choice. Consequently, for j = i + 1, properties (3) and (4) are true with the default choice A1i+1 = A1i and
A2i+1 = ∅.
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Eventually, the algorithm deletes certain forbidden edges in the following way.
2nd priority (firm rejection) step. If e = uv is a free 1-arc of A1i and e <v f ∈ Ei(v) (e is strictly better than f according to
v in Gi) then we delete f .
Note that the above f is already forbidden by a 1st priority mild rejection step. Assume that f blocks matchingM , hence,
in particular, e ∉ M . But e, being a first choice of u, also blocksM . So deleting f does not change the set of stable matchings
of the preference model.
Note that the so called 1st phase steps in Irving’s algorithm [5] for the stable roommates problem are special cases of our
proposal and firm rejection steps. It is true for the stable roommates problem that as soon as no more 1st phase steps can
be executed, the preference model has the so called first-last property: if some edge e = uv is a first choice of u, then e is
the last choice of v. The next lemma shows that generalization of this property holds also in our setting. Assume that the
algorithm cannot execute a 0th, 1st or 2nd priority step for (Gi, Fi, A1i , A
2
i ,Oi). Let V
0
i denote the set of those vertices of Gi
that are not incident with any free edges, V 1i stand for the set of those vertices of Gi that are incident with a bioriented free
1-arc and V 2i refer to the set of the remaining vertices of Gi. The following properties are true.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that no proposal or rejection step is possible in instance (Gi, Fi, A1i , A
2
i ,Oi) and let V
0
i , V
1
i and V
2
i be defined
as above.
If v ∈ V 1i ∪ V 2i then there is a unique 1-arc entering v and there is a unique 1-arc leaving v and both of these 1-arcs are free.
There is no edge of Gi that leaves V 0i . Bioriented free 1-arcs form a matching M1 that covers V
1
i and no more edges are incident
with V 1i in Gi.
M is a stable matching of (Gi, Fi,Oi) if and only if the following properties hold:
(1) each vertex of V 0i is isolated and
(2) M1 ⊆ M and
(3) M \M1 is a stable matching of the model restricted to V 2i .
Proof. Let v ∈ V 1i ∪ V 2i . By definition, there is at least one free edge incident with v, hence there is at least one free 1-arc
leaving v. On the other hand, no proposal or rejection step (mild or firm) can be made in Gi, hence at most one free 1-arc
enters v. By definition, no free 1-arc enters any vertex of V 0i , and this means that 1-arcs leaving vertices of V
1
i ∪V 2i enter this
very same vertex set. Consequently, there is a unique free 1-arc leaving and entering each vertex of V 1i ∪ V 2i . Can there be
a forbidden 1-arc e incident with a vertex v of V 1i ∪ V 2i ? The answer is no and we prove it indirectly. Assume that e⃗ is such
a 1-arc. If e⃗ enters v then v would be able to reject, a contradiction. So e⃗ = (vw) is a 1-arc of A1i from V 1i ∪ V 2i to V 0i . But w
is not incident with any free arcs by definition, thus (vu) is also a 1-arc of A1i that enters vertex u of V
1
i ∪ V 2i , contradiction
again. Hence each 1-arc of A1i incident with V
1
i ∪ V 2i is free.
Let u ∈ V 0i and e = uv be an edge of Gi. Clearly e⃗ = (uv) is a 1-arc and e⃗ ∈ Fi by the definition of V 0i , so v ∈ V 0i holds.
This means that each edge of Gi incident with a vertex of V 0i is completely inside V
0
i .
If v is in V 1i then there is a unique 1-arc a that leaves v, so a must be bioriented by the definition of V
1
i . If e = uv is an
edge of Gi then either e is the unoriented version of a or e is not a first choice of v, hence a <v e holds. But in this latter case
v should delete e in a firm rejection step as a is a 1-arc entering v. This argument shows that edges of Gi that are incident
with V 1i are all bioriented and form a matchingM1 covering V
1
i .
Assume now that M is a stable matching of Gi. No edge of Gi incident with a vertex of V 0i can block M , hence V
0
i must
consist of isolated vertices. AsM is not blocked by an edge ofM1, edges ofM1 all belong toM . As there is no edge of Gi that
leaves V 2i , edges ofM in V
2
i form a stable matching of the restricted model to V
2
i .
Let now M2 be a stable matching of the model restricted to V 2i and assume that V
0
i consists of isolated vertices. Let
M := M2 ∪ M1. Clearly, M is a matching. If some edge e blocks M then e cannot be incident with V 0i , as these vertices are
isolated, and e cannot have a vertex in V 1i either, as vertices of V
1
i are only incident with edges of M1. Hence e is an edge
within V 2i , contradicting to the fact thatM2 is a stable matching of the model restricted to V
2
i . 
Lemma 2.1 shows that as soon as we have a (forbidden) edge incident with some vertex of V 0i for an instance where no
proposal or rejection step is possible then there exists no stable matching in our instance, so the algorithm can stopwith the
conclusion that in the original instance there is no stablematchingwhatsoever. Another possible conclusion of the algorithm
is that eventually no proposal or rejection step can be made and V 2i = ∅ holds. In this case, if V 0i consists of isolated vertices
then graph Gi is just matching M1 and this is a stable matching for the instance after the ith step, hence it is also a stable
matching for the original instance. So our goal from now on is to get rid off the V 2 part and to achieve this, the algorithm
will work only on V 2i .
Assume that in instance (Gi, Fi, A1i , A
2
i ,Oi), the algorithm can execute no 0th, 1st or 2nd priority step. By Lemma 2.1,
every vertex v of V 2i is incident with at least one free second choice edge: in the ‘‘worst case’’ it is the unique 1-arc pointing
to v.
3rd priority (2-arc finding) step. If e = vw ∉ A2i is a second choice of v then find 2-arcwv.
What is the meaning of a 2-arc? Let vv′ and uu′ be 1-arcs and u′v be a 2-arc. As vv′ is the only free edge dominating
u′v at v, we get that if uu′ is present in a stable matching M then uu′ does not dominate uv′, hence vv′ ∈ M follows.
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In other words, 2-arcs represent implications on 1-arcs. This allows us to build an implication structure on the set of
1-arcs.
In this structure, two 1-arcs e and f are called sm-equivalent, if there is a directed cycle D formed by 1-arcs and 2-arcs
in an alternating manner such that D contains both e and f . (Note that D may use the same vertex more than once.) Sm-
equivalence is clearly an equivalence relation and if C is an sm-class andM is a stablematching then either C is disjoint from
M or C is contained inM .
Beyond determining sm-equivalence classes, 2-arcs yield further implications between sm-classes: if uu′ is a 1-arc of
sm-class C and vv′ is a 1-arc of sm-class C ′ and u′v is a 2-arc, then sm-class C ‘‘implies’’ sm-class C ′ in such a way that if C
is not disjoint from stable matching M then M contains both classes C and C ′. Assume that sm-class C is on the top of this
implication structure, i.e. C is not implied by any other sm-class (but C may imply certain other classes). Formally, we have
that
if vv′ is a 1-arc of C andw′v is a 2-arc then (the unique) 1-arcww′ is sm-equivalent to vv′. (5)
To find a top sm-class C , introduce an auxiliary digraph on the vertices of Gi, such that if uu′ is a 1-arc and u′v is a 2-
arc, then we introduce an arc uv of the auxiliary graph. It is well known that by depth first search, we can find a source
strong component of the auxiliary graph in linear time. If it contains vertices u1, u2, . . . , uk then it determines a top sm-
class C = {u1u′1, u2u′2, . . . , uku′k} formed by 1-arcs. Note that it is possible here that ul = u′t for different l and t . After we
have found all 2-arcs (and there are no proposal or rejection steps) in instance (Gi, Fi, A1i , A
2
i ,Oi) then the algorithm looks
for a
4th priority (2-arc elimination) step. If for 1-arcs ulu′l, utu′t ∈ C there are 2-arcs vul and vut with vul ≮v vut then forbid
vul and keep 1-arcs and 2-arcs: A1i+1 = A1i and A2i+1 = A2i .
To justify this step, assume that vul ∈ M for some stable matching M of Gi. As vul does not dominate vut , vut has to be
dominated at ut by utu′t ∈ M . As ulu′l and utu′t are sm-equivalent, this means that utu′t also belongs toM , a contradiction. So
vul does not belong to any stable matching and after forbidding it, the set of stable matchings does not change. This proves
(1) and (2). As the forbidden edge vul is a second choice of ul and not ≤v-better than vut , vul is a first choice of neither v
nor ul. Consequently, after forbidding vul, first and second choices remain first and second choices, respectively. It follows
that a 4th priority step preserves conditions (3) and (4). Note that though a 4th priority step does not change first choices,
it may create new second choices hence the algorithmmight continue with a 3rd priority step after executing a 4th priority
one. Note also that if preferences are linear (rather than partial) orders then no 4th priority step is possible.
If none of the above steps is possible anymore then the top sm-equivalence class C can be forbidden. This is the step that
corresponds to the ‘rotation elimination’ step in Irving’s algorithm. Note that by the impossibility of a 4th priority step, any
top sm-equivalence class C = {(ulu′l) : 1 ≤ l ≤ k} has the property that there is exactly one 2-arc entering each ul, that is,
there is a unique second choice of each vertex ul.
5th priority (top class elimination) step. Forbid all edges of C in (Gi, Fi,Oi) and set A2i+1 = ∅.
As we forbid 1-arcs, first and second choices along the vertices of C change after a 5th priority step. In particular, the
unique second choices of the ul vertices of C become first choices. For this reason we change A1i+1 = A1i ∪ S−1, where S
denotes the set of those 2-arcs that enter some vertex ul of C and S−1 is the set of oppositely oriented arcs of S. After these
changes, all arcs in A1i+1 are clearly first choices of their initial nodes, hence (3) and (4) hold for j = i+1. To justify properties
(1) and (2) for the 5th priority step, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: C is not a matching. This means that ul = u′t for some l ≠ t . As a subset of a matching is a matching, no matching
(hence no stable matching) can contain C . So by sm-equivalence, C is disjoint from any stable matching of Gi, and forbidding
C does not change the set of stable matchings.
Case 2: C is a matching. Each ul is adjacent to at least two free edges: the incoming and the outgoing 1-arcs. So each ul
receives at least one free 2-arc. This free 2-arc must come from some u′t by property (5). Let C ′ denote the set of free 2-arcs
of the form u′tul. As we have seen, each ul receives at least one arc of C ′, hence |C ′| ≥ k. As we cannot execute any more 4th
priority steps in (Gi, Fi,Oi), from each u′t there is at most one arc of C ′ leaving, implying |C ′| ≤ k. This means that |C ′| = k
and each ul receives exactly one arc of C ′ and each u′l sends exactly one arc of C ′. As sets {u1, u2, . . . , uk} and {u′1, u′2, . . . , u′k}
are disjoint, this means that set C ′ forms a perfect matching on vertices u1, u′1, u2, u
′
2, . . . , uk, u
′
k.
LetM be a stable matching of (Gi, Fi,Oi). IfM is disjoint from C thenM is stable in (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1) as well. Otherwise,
by sm-equivalence,M contains all edges of C and disjoint from C ′. We claim thatM ′ := M \C∪C ′ is another stablematching
of (Gi, Fi,Oi) and hence it is a stable matching of (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1), as well.
Indeed:M ′ is amatching, as C and C ′ cover the same set of vertices. Each edge ulu′l is dominated at u
′
l byM
′ by Lemma 2.1.
Each forbidden 2-arc of type u′tul is dominated at u′t by the 4th priority step. For the remaining edges, if some edge e does
not have a vertex ul then e is dominated the same way inM ′ as inM . Otherwise, if ul is a vertex of e then e is neither a first
nor a second choice of ul as we have already checked these edges. This means that the free 2-arc pointing to ul is dominating
e, so C ′ and thusM ′ also dominates e at ul.
The pseudocode below summarizes how our algorithmworks. The organization of the steps is justified by the fact that a
firm rejection step always deletes a forbidden edge, hence no new first choice is created. Similarly, 2-arc finding and 2-arc
elimination steps do not change the set of first choices and preserve properties described in Lemma 2.1.
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Input: (G0, F0,O0) Output: Super-stable matching, if exists
A10 :=A20 := ∅, i := 0
1 IF there is a first choice uv of u that is not a 1-arc
THEN (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1, A1i+1, A
2
i+1) := (Gi, Fi,Oi, A1i ∪ {uv}, A2i ),
i := i+ 1, GO TO 1
ELSE
2 IF mild rejection is possible for some edge uv of Gi
THEN (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1, A1i+1, A
2
i+1) := (Gi, Fi ∪ {uv},Oi, A1i , A2i ),
i := i+ 1, GO TO 1
ELSE
3 IF firm rejection is possible for some edge uv of Gi
THEN (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1, A1i+1, A
2
i+1) := (Gi − {uv}, Fi \ {uv},Oi|Gi+1 ), A1i \ {uv}, A2i \ {uv},
i := i+ 1, GO TO 3
ELSE
4 IF there is a second choice uv of u that is not a 2-arc
THEN (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1, A1i+1, A
2
i+1) := (Gi, Fi,Oi, A1i , A2i ∪ {vu}),
i := i+ 1, GO TO 4
ELSE
5 IF some 2-arc uv ∈ A2i can be eliminated
THEN (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1, A1i+1, A
2
i+1) := (Gi, Fi ∪ {uv},Oi, A1i , A2i ),
i := i+ 1, GO TO 4
ELSE
6 IF some sm-equivalence class C can be eliminated
THEN (Gi+1, Fi+1,Oi+1, A1i+1, A
2
i+1) := (Gi − C, Fi \ C,Oi, A1i ∪ S−1,∅),
i := i+ 1, GO TO 1
ELSE
7 IF each vertex of V 0i is isolated
THEN OUTPUT super-stable matching Ei
ELSE OUTPUT ‘‘No super-stable matching exists’’
END IF
END IF
END IF
END IF
END IF
END IF
STOP
The following theorem justifies the correctness of our algorithm.
Theorem 2.2. Assume that the algorithm cannot execute any more step at some instance (Gi, Fi, A1i , A
2
i ,Oi). Then V
2
i = ∅.
Proof. Assume indirectly that v is a vertex of V 2i , so by Lemma2.1, v sends a free 1-arc, and also receives a free 1-arc different
from the opposite of the previous one. It follows that there is a 2-arc pointing to v. This implies that a 4th or a 5th priority
step can be executed, a contradiction. 
To finish the description of the algorithm, we should recall our earlier remark. By Theorem 2.2, when the algorithm
terminates then we have V 2i = ∅, so by Lemma 2.1, if V 0i spans some edge then the conclusion is that there is no stable
matching, otherwise, if each vertex of V 0i is isolated then there is a stable matching of the original instance, and the edge set
Ei of Gi forms such a matching. The following theorem estimates the complexity of our algorithm.
Theorem 2.3. Assume that preference model (G, F ,O) is such that G has n vertices and m edges we can decide for each edge
e = uv of G whether e is a first or second choice of u in constant time for any preference model created from (G, F ,O) after
forbidding and deleting edges. The algorithm we described above finds a stable matching or concludes that no stable matching
exists in O (m · (n+m)) time.
Proof. Wehave seen that if the algorithm terminates then it has the right answer, so we only need to prove that the running
time is O (m · (n+m)). As we have seen, in each step, the algorithm changes the current instance by changing the set of
1-arcs or 2-arcs or by forbidding or deleting certain edges. Let us call the latter two transformations major events. Clearly,
during the course of the algorithm there can be at most 2m major events as there are m edges that can be forbidden or
eventually deleted. We show that between two consecutive major events the algorithm needs O(n+m) time.
If a major event is a 1st priority (mild rejection) step, then previously we had to find all 1-arcs (in O(n + m) time) and
finding the forbidden edge after this can be done in O(n+m) time again. If the major event is a 2nd priority (firm rejection)
step then it is preceded by 0th priority proposal steps (takingO(n+m) time again) and checks for 1st priority (mild rejection)
steps taking O(n+m) time. We need again O(n+m) time to find the edge to be deleted in the 2nd priority (firm rejection)
step.
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The next major event type is a 4th priority (2-arc eliminating) step. It is preceded by executing all 0th priority (proposal)
steps and checking for 1st and 2nd priority steps that take altogether O(n + m) time. Then we find all 2-arcs in O(n + m)
time, find top sm-class C by depth first search in O(n+m) time and find the deleted edge O(n+m) time again.
The remaining major event happens in a 5th priority step. So after the previous major event we had at most O(n) 0th
priority proposal steps that take O(n + m) time, checks for 1st and 2nd priority rejection steps taking O(n + m) time, we
had to find all 2-arcs in O(n+m) time, we find top sm-class C in O(n+m) time and check for 2-arc elimination in O(n+m)
time again.
The above estimates prove that there is O(n+ m) time between consecutive major events. We have seen that there are
O(m)major events, so our algorithm terminates in O (m · (n+m)) time, just as we claimed in the theorem. 
The time complexity in Theorem2.3 is pretty rough. This is partly due to the fact that in 5th priority (top class elimination)
steps we throw away all 2-arcs in spite of the fact that most of them can be reused. Probably by payingmore attention to the
changes of second choices and by using more appropriate data structures one can streamline the algorithm to approach the
complexity of Irving’s original algorithm described in [5]. As we mentioned, our goal was not a competitive algorithm but
a description of a polynomial-time method with a compact proof of correctness that gives hope to find further structural
results on stable matchings. We think that this goal is achieved.
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